CENTRAL ORGANISATION FOR RAILWAY ELECTRIFICATION vs. M/S ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A JOINT VENTURE COMPANY, 2024 (SC) 874

CENTRAL ORGANISATION FOR RAILWAY ELECTRIFICATION vs. M/S ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A JOINT VENTURE COMPANY, 2024 (SC) 874

FACTS: The references arise in the cases Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. M/s ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Company and JSW Steel Limited v. South Western Railway & Anr. The Law Commission of India in its 246th Report opined that party autonomy cannot be stretched to disregard the principles of impartiality and independence of the arbitral process, specifically at the stage of constituting of an arbitral tribunal. Hence, the Law Commission suggested automatic disqualification of persons whose relationship with the parties falls under any of the categories specified by law. Following upon the recommendations of the Law Commission, Parliament enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2015 to incorporate Section 12(5) . Section 12(5) renders a person whose relationship with the parties falls under any of the categories specified under the Seventh Schedule ineligible for appointment. Given the 2015 amendment, parties filed applications under Section 11(6) urging the invalidation of appointment procedures which gave one party dominance in appointing arbitrators.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta appearing for the Union mainly contended that (1) arbitration having its roots in a contract between parties, reflects a necessary act of volition (mutual agreement by the parties for arbitration of disputes); (2) party autonomy as a concept is ingrained in the entire architecture of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 (1996 Act); (3) the respondent's arguments suggesting a neutral panel is incorrect, the correct issue to be examined is whether there is a restriction which prohibits the panel of arbitrators curated by one party; (4) the panel of arbitrators is 'maintained' by the PSUs/ government party and not 'controlled'- the difference is that in maintaining the panel, the neutrality of the arbitrators in ensured.

Issue: Whether Unilateral Arbitrator Appointment Clauses In Public-Private Contracts Valid & whether a person, who is ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator, can appoint an arbitrator?

Observation: The Constitution Bench comprising Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice PS Narasimha, Justice JB Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra was considering the validity of an arbitration clause that prescribes that the appointment of the arbitrator will happen from a panel of arbitrators curated by one of the parties, which is mostly a public sector undertaking (PSU) in majority of the cases. The Supreme Court ruled against clauses allowing Public Sector Undertakings to appoint arbitrators to decide disputes with private contractors unilaterally. Court held that:

I. Dispute resolution through arbitration encompasses two independent yet interdependent principles: contractual freedom as party autonomy and statutory obligation as duty to constitute an independent arbitral tribunal.

II. Party autonomy in making of an arbitration agreement is an essential feature of arbitration. It commences with choosing the members of the arbitral tribunal, extends to the procedure that would apply for its conduct, and concludes with the method by which an award could be challenged before a court. It is thus a brooding and guiding spirit of arbitration. Party autonomy is sufficiently incorporated in the Arbitration Act, along with a restraint on judicial intervention.

III. The moment parties choose arbitration over ordinary civil proceedings for dispute resolution, their duty to establish an independent and impartial tribunal arises. The substitution of arbitration in place of civil courts as an exception under Section 28 of the Contract Act is only for a forum and not for contracting out of the most essential feature of a dispute resolution, i.e., independence and impartiality must exist in every forum. This essential feature is the inviolable public policy consideration under Section 23 of the Contract Act from which the parties cannot opt out. Arbitration agreements which are not compliant of this public policy consideration are void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. Thus, there is a statutory incorporation of duties of the parties to the arbitration agreement.

IV. If an arbitration agreement is considered by the court as not enabling constitution of an independent and impartial tribunal, any submission that the said agreement is a binding contract, or it is in exercise of party autonomy is not tenable as such an agreement will be against public policy and as such not an enforceable contract.

V. In view of the statutory incorporation of these duties, it is not necessary to apply public law principles evolved in constitutional and administrative laws. Sourcing these duty obligations from Contract Act and Arbitration Act is important to maintain the integrity of the party autonomy and restraint of judicial institutions.

VI. The power to ensure that the arbitration agreement is compliant of the public policy requirement of establishing an independent and impartial tribunal is always of the Court. This principle is recognised and statutorily incorporated in the Contract Act and the Arbitration Act. It is the duty of the court to ensure that the arbitration agreement inspires confidence and it will enable establishment of an independent and impartial arbitral tribunal.

VII. Neither public policy considerations under the Contract Act or the Arbitration Act restrain the parties to the arbitration from maintaining a panel of arbitrators in any manner. However, arbitration agreements enabling one of the parties to unilaterally constitute arbitral tribunal do not inspire confidence of independence and may violate the public policy requirement of constituting an independent and impartial tribunal. The court will, therefore, scrutinise the agreement and hold them to be invalid if it considers it appropriate.

VIII. The occasion for the court to examine the constitution of the independent and impartial tribunal under the arbitration clause will arise when one of the parties makes an application under Sections 11, 14 or 34. It is not permissible for the court to give an advance declaration that all such agreements which enable one of the parties to unilaterally constitute the arbitral tribunal would be void per se. No two agreements are the same and it is necessary for the court to examine the text and context of the agreement.

IX. All applications pending before the courts challenging the unilateral appointment clauses will be disposed of applying the test as to whether such a clause enables establishment of an independent and impartial tribunal.