competence, financial powers, and institutional autonomy. Recent disputes over matters such as the Goods and Services Tax (GST), the extent of powers of the Delhi government, and the Governor’s role in state politics highlight the dynamism of this arrangement. The question is not whether conflicts will arise, but how they will be resolved.

The Constitution provides multiple mechanisms to manage these tensions: Article 131 for disputes between the Union and States, the Finance Commission for fiscal redistribution, and the Rajya Sabha as the federal chamber. Yet, the lived reality often reveals friction, especially when the same political party does not control both levels of government.

Judiciary as Federal Arbiter

The judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, has consistently positioned itself as the guardian of the federal equilibrium. Landmark cases illustrate this role. In State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1962), the Court held that states cannot claim sovereignty against the Union, emphasizing the unique nature of Indian federalism. Conversely, in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Court reinforced state autonomy by curbing the misuse of Article 356, marking a turning point in Centre-State relations.

More recently, in the Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India decisions, the Court clarified the scope of elected government’s powers in Delhi, balancing representative democracy with constitutional design. These judgments highlight how the Court becomes both the referee and the philosopher of federalism.

Federal Conflicts in Contemporary India

Tensions are particularly acute in areas of fiscal federalism and administrative control. The GST regime, while promoting uniform taxation, has raised concerns of revenue dependency among states. Similarly, centrally sponsored schemes often blur the lines between cooperation and coercion. The Governor’s discretionary powers in states—whether in calling assemblies, inviting parties to form government, or approving bills—remain another recurring flashpoint.

Judicial pronouncements in these matters do more than resolve disputes; they redefine the contours of cooperative governance. The Court’s interpretations set the tone for Centre-State negotiations and sometimes push political actors towards dialogue.

From Conflict to Cooperation

The essence of Indian federalism is cooperative governance. Yet cooperation cannot be reduced to rhetoric; it must translate into institutions that promote dialogue rather than confrontation. Inter-state councils, empowered finance commissions, and a more robust Rajya Sabha can facilitate this shift. Judicial interventions, though necessary, cannot be the sole mechanism of federal balance. They are curative, not preventive.

The challenge lies in moving from court-imposed equilibrium to political maturity, where both Union and States recognize federalism not as a zero-sum game but as shared responsibility.

Conclusion

Federalism in India is indeed in flux—tested by political polarization, fiscal strain, and competing visions of governance. The courts have emerged as indispensable custodians of this delicate arrangement, ensuring that the constitutional promise of unity in diversity does not descend into central domination or fragmented autonomy. Yet, lasting stability requires more than judicial verdicts; it demands a political culture of dialogue, mutual respect, and genuine cooperation.

As India navigates the complexities of a 21st-century democracy, the federal compact must remain dynamic but resilient. The judiciary will continue to play its role as sentinel, but the future of cooperative governance ultimately rests in the hands of political statesmanship.