a limited and procedural discretion has, in practice, evolved into a contentious tool of political influence.
In Tamil Nadu, Governor R.N. Ravi’s decision to delay or withhold assent to multiple bills passed by the state legislature has led to severe institutional friction. Among the withheld bills were significant ones related to the functioning of universities and the powers of the state government in appointing Vice-Chancellors. The Governor’s prolonged inaction prompted the Tamil Nadu government to approach the Supreme Court, arguing that such delays undermine the will of the people and paralyze governance.

The Supreme Court’s observations have been unambiguous. A Constitution Bench, hearing a similar dispute in Punjab, remarked that Governors cannot act as “obstructionists” in a parliamentary democracy. The court emphasized that the role of the Governor is not to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the legislature, but to facilitate the constitutional process. The Governor, as the constitutional head, must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers — except in cases where the Constitution explicitly grants discretion.

This issue, however, is not confined to Tamil Nadu. Similar impasses have emerged in Kerala, Telangana, and Punjab, revealing a larger pattern of confrontation between opposition-ruled states and the Union-appointed Governors. The friction raises an uncomfortable question: Are Governors acting as neutral constitutional authorities, or as political agents of the Centre?

The framers of the Constitution envisioned the Governor as a vital link between the Union and the State, not as an adversarial force. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, while defending the office of the Governor in the Constituent Assembly, made it clear that the position was not intended to interfere with the day-to-day administration. Yet, seven decades later, the office is increasingly perceived as a mechanism for political control rather than constitutional balance.

In Tamil Nadu’s case, the prolonged withholding of assent not only disrupts legislative functioning but also erodes public faith in democratic institutions. When bills passed by a duly elected assembly remain in limbo for months, it is the people’s mandate that suffers. The Constitution’s spirit demands cooperation and respect for institutional roles — not confrontation or delay.

There is a growing consensus among constitutional experts that reforms are necessary. Some suggest setting a time limit for Governors to act on bills, similar to the President’s obligation under Article 111. Others call for clearer guidelines from the Supreme Court to prevent misuse of discretionary powers. The principle of cooperative federalism, which underpins India’s constitutional scheme, cannot survive if state governments are persistently undermined by gubernatorial overreach.

The impasse in Tamil Nadu serves as a warning bell for Indian democracy. The Governor’s role must return to its intended constitutional boundaries — that of a facilitator, not a political arbiter. A democracy thrives when institutions act within their limits and respect each other’s mandates. The need of the hour is not confrontation but constitutional restraint — a return to the values of trust, balance, and respect for the people’s will that lie at the core of the Indian Republic.