Judicial Review of Gubernatorial Powers: The Tamil Nadu Governor Case

The recent friction between the Tamil Nadu government and Governor R.N. Ravi has once again brought the spotlight on the constitutional role of Governors in India. The controversy is not isolated—it reflects a deeper and persistent issue in India’s federal polity: the misuse or overreach of gubernatorial powers. The question that now arises is—can the judiciary step in to check this? And if so, to what extent can the powers of the Governor be subjected to judicial review?

The crux of the matter in Tamil Nadu relates to Governor Ravi’s delay in granting assent to bills passed by the State Assembly, and his refusal to act on decisions of the elected government, particularly in areas where the Governor has no discretionary power. This has led to a constitutional and political standoff, forcing the matter into the judicial domain. The Supreme Court, in early 2024, made strong

observations against the Governor's delay, calling it “a matter of concern” and sought an explanation on why constitutionally mandated decisions were being withheld.

Under Article 154 of the Constitution, the executive power of the state is vested in the Governor. However, under Article 163, the Governor is expected to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except in matters where discretion is explicitly provided. The role of the Governor is thus largely ceremonial, and discretion is limited. Yet, over the years, Governors have increasingly been accused of acting as agents of the Centre, especially in states ruled by opposition parties.

The judicial review of gubernatorial powers has a limited but significant history in Indian constitutional jurisprudence. In Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974), the Supreme Court laid down that the President and Governors are constitutional heads and must act according to the advice of their respective Councils of Ministers. Later, in Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016), the Court held that the Governor cannot act independently in matters where the Constitution does not provide for discretion.

The Tamil Nadu case adds a fresh layer to this jurisprudence by highlighting inaction or indefinite delay by the Governor. The Tamil Nadu government had passed several bills, including those related to university appointments and state-run educational institutions, which remained pending with the Governor for months. Eventually, the State Assembly had to re

pass the bills, asserting its authority. In the backdrop, the Supreme Court asked a fundamental question: Can a Governor sit on a bill indefinitely? This opens the door to a new kind of judicial intervention—not just reviewing an action of the Governor, but also reviewing inaction.

This case may redefine the balance between constitutional morality and institutional independence. The judiciary, without interfering in the day-to-day functioning of executive offices, has a duty to ensure that constitutional roles are not abused or left unfulfilled. The Tamil Nadu Governor case is a test of that principle.

More broadly, this raises concerns about federalism. India’s Constitution envisages a cooperative federal structure, where both Centre and States function within their assigned domains. When the office of the Governor is misused to delay or derail the functioning of a state government, it violates the spirit of federalism and democratic accountability.

In conclusion, the judicial review of gubernatorial powers is both necessary and delicate. The courts must walk a fine line—protecting the Constitution without overstepping into political battles. The Tamil Nadu case may not just be about a state or a Governor; it may well shape the future interpretation of constitutional checks and balances in Indian democracy. If the judiciary reaffirms the Governor’s accountability to the Constitution and not the Centre, it will strengthen both federalism and democratic governance in India.