Observation: The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which was in force prior to the enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, the legal position was that though the persons connected with the solemnization of a marriage in contravention of the provisions of the Child Marriage Restraint Act were liable for punishment, the marriage itself was not rendered void or null and void.

Held: It was not the intention of the legislature that contravention of every and any condition, specified in Section 5 would render a Hindu Marriage void. The contravention of only any of the three conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5 would render a Hindu Marriage null and void. Therefore, the marriage of a minor wife is neither void nor voidable, though it contravened the condition, specified in clause (vi) of Section 5 of the Act inasmuch as the consent of her guardian to the marriage was not obtained.

Digvijay Singh v. Pratap Kumari (AIR 1970 SC 137)

It was held that a party is considered impotent if their mental or physical condition renders consummation of the marriage practically impossible. According to the statute, this condition must have existed at the time of the marriage and persisted until the initiation of legal proceedings. To obtain a decree of nullity, the appellant must establish that the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage and remained so until the commencement of the proceedings.

The case involved a wife who had undergone a uterus removal operation prior to marriage, leading to allegations of impotence and inability to bear children. The court noted that the absence of a uterus does not determine impotence regarding sexual intercourse. Impotence refers to the incapacity for sexual intercourse or when coition is difficult or painful. The court upheld that the removal of the uterus did not render the wife impotent, and thus, the marriage could not be declared void. It was emphasized that the inability to bear children does not necessarily constitute impotence under divorce laws.

Samar v. Snigdha (AIR 1977 Cal 213)

It was observed that before the 1976 amendment, the ground for nullity under the Hindu Marriage Act was the respondent's impotence at the time of marriage and continued impotence until the initiation of proceedings. However, the law underwent a change with the amendment, which now specifies that the marriage has not been consummated due to the respondent's impotence.

It was held that sexual intercourse, also known as consummation or vera copula, involves erection and penetration by the male into the female. Full and complete penetration is a necessary component of regular intercourse, irrespective of the degree of sexual satisfaction experienced by the parties involved. Therefore, in a case where the wife suffered from vaginismus, rendering complete penetration impossible, the petitioner was deemed entitled to a divorce decree.

P v. K

Facts: The marriage had not been consummated owing to the impotency of the respondent. On the very first night the respondent refused to have sexual intercourse saying that for one year she would not have sexual intercourse with the appellant.

Held: In the present case the respondent was impotent for two reasons. Firstly, it is proved that the respondent resisted all the approaches of the petitioner to consummate the marriage, possibly with a view to conceal the condition or prevent the pain which may possibly result because of the inter-course and secondly because with such a pro lapse the intercourse is possible only after manipulation with hands and the sight of the protruding uterus (the wife had a medical condition) is more likely to result in frustration for the husband. Therefore, both reasons independently of each other are indicative of impotency and this coupled with non-consummation which I have already held, to have been established entitled the petitioner to annulment of the marriage.