then, as a Directive Principle.
The reality is that both the executive and legislature are often intertwined, and the judiciary, while meant to be independent, frequently steps into policy arenas.

This overlap, while sometimes necessary, has increasingly sparked concern. The judiciary, in particular, has drawn attention for its interventions into executive and legislative matters. From the cancellation of telecom licenses in 2G Spectrum case to environmental bans and directions on education policy, the courts have regularly shaped policy outcomes. The most recent example is the Supreme Court’s role in 2024–25 in scrutinizing electoral bonds, directing the Election Commission to disclose donor data—an action praised for transparency but critiqued for encroaching upon legislative silence.

Similarly, state High Courts have issued binding directions on surveillance regulations, prison reforms, and AI governance—matters traditionally considered executive prerogatives. Critics argue that these judicial actions, however well-intentioned, reflect a growing judicial overreach, where courts assume powers beyond adjudication. The line between interpretation and legislation appears to be increasingly blurred.

Yet, the judiciary is not acting in a vacuum. Its assertiveness often arises from legislative abdication and executive dominance. Laws like the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, passed with limited debate in 2023, reflect a worrying trend of weakening parliamentary scrutiny. The overuse of ordinances, minimal discussion on major bills, and the centralisation of power in the executive have left gaps that the judiciary has stepped in to fill. In doing so, courts often become the only avenue for accountability—however imperfect that may be.

At the same time, the executive has not shied away from asserting itself over the judiciary. The ongoing standoff over judicial appointments is a case in point. Despite multiple judicial orders, the Union Government has delayed Collegium recommendations, even returning names without explanation. The Law Commission’s recent 2025 consultation paper proposing a National Judicial Appointments Authority has reignited the debate around checks, balances, and independence. The executive’s criticism of so-called “judicial activism” coexists uneasily with its own efforts to dilute institutional autonomy.

Meanwhile, the legislature remains the least assertive organ in this triangular contest. Its decreasing productivity, limited debates, and declining role in shaping policy have further distorted the constitutional equilibrium. With no robust mechanism to scrutinize executive decisions, Parliament increasingly plays a reactive role, far from its intended stature as the primary lawmaking body.

So, is the separation of powers in India real or illusory? The answer lies somewhere in between. The Constitution envisages a system of interdependence, not isolation. But the spirit of the doctrine lies in institutional respect, not turf wars. What India faces today is not the absence of the doctrine, but its distortion. The overlap between organs has grown not out of constitutional design, but due to institutional imbalance and democratic deficit.

To restore faith in the doctrine, all three organs must return to their constitutional roles— robust legislature, accountable executive, and restrained judiciary. The doctrine of separation of powers in India is not a delusion—but if ignored, it could become one.