
Introduction
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar once emphasized that true democracy goes beyond just having political rights; it requires a foundation of social equality and justice. He believed that liberty, equality, and fraternity must work together to build a fair society. Ambedkar’s vision was that democracy should address not only the formal aspects of equality but also the underlying social and economic disparities.
This vision is particularly pertinent when discussing the recent Supreme Court case, State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh. This case brings to the forefront a key issue: whether it is constitutionally valid to further sub-divide Scheduled Castes (SCs) to provide targeted benefits to those who are most disadvantaged within these groups. This represents a shift from previous decisions, such as in E.V. Chinnaiah, which had ruled against such sub-classifications.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Davinder Singh recognizes that SCs are not a homogenous group and that some sub-groups may require more specific support.
As we examine this case, it is important to consider how it aligns with Dr. Ambedkar’s vision of a democracy where social justice is not merely a theoretical concept but a practical reality.
Key Constitutional jurisprudence relevant to the case:
Article 14 of the Constitution stipulates that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India. Article 15(1) states that the State should not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15(4) stipulates that nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
Article 16 deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Clause (1) of Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Clause (2) stipulates that no citizen shall be discriminated in or be ineligible for any employment or office under the State on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Clause (4) of the provision states that nothing in Article 16 shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, which in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.
Article 366(24) of the Constitution defines the term ‘Scheduled Castes’ to mean such castes, tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, races or tribes as are deemed under Article 341 to be Scheduled Castes for the purposes of the Constitution. Article 341(1) grants the President the power to notify the castes, races or tribes (or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes) which shall be deemed to be Scheduled Castes for a State or a Union Territory for the purposes of the Constitution. The President has been empowered to issue the notification with respect to a State in consultation with the Governor of the State. Article 341(2) stipulates that Parliament may by law include or exclude any caste, race, or tribe (or part of or group within any caste, race, or tribe) from the list of Scheduled Castes specified in the notification and that a notification issued under clause (1) shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.
Historical context/background:
The present case involves a dispute among different classes within the Scheduled Castes. Some groups argue that they are more disadvantaged and therefore deserve additional preferential treatment compared to the more privileged groups within the same category. Conversely, other groups within the Scheduled Castes contend that once a group is included in the Presidential List of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, it should be considered as a uniform group, making any further sub-classification unconstitutional. The issue at hand is whether the more disadvantaged groups within the Scheduled Castes are entitled to greater benefits compared to the relatively better-off segments within the same larger category.
In 1975, the Punjab government issued a notification that split its 25% reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) into two distinct categories. The first category reserved seats specifically for the Balmiki and Mazhabi Sikh communities, acknowledging these as the most economically and educationally disadvantaged groups in the state. According to the notification, these communities were given priority in reservations for education and public employment. The second category included the other SC communities.
This notification remained in force for nearly 30 years but faced legal challenges in 2004. A five-judge Constitution Bench had previously invalidated a similar law enacted by Andhra Pradesh in 2000. The Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation of Reservations) Act, 2000 (AP Act 20 of 2000), challenged by E.V. Chinnaiah, was introduced following recommendations from a committee led by Justice Ramachandra Raju. This committee had identified specific groups within the Scheduled Castes listed under Article 341 of the Indian Constitution that had not benefited adequately from reservations in professional college admissions and state services. The Supreme Court, in the E.V. Chinnaiah case, declared the Andhra Pradesh Act unconstitutional, finding that it violated the principle of equality by creating a detailed list of SC communities and allocating specific reservation quotas for each group.
Creamy Layer Debate in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh.
The Supreme Court has now reversed the decision from the E.V. Chinnaiah case, allowing for sub-classification within the Scheduled Castes in State of Punjab And Ors. v. Davinder Singh And Ors. This ruling is set to have a significant impact on states seeking to offer more targeted protection to certain SC groups that remain under-represented despite existing reservations, compared to more dominant SC communities. The Court observed that "historical and empirical evidence indicates that Scheduled Castes are not a homogenous group." It further clarified that while sub-classification is permissible, states cannot allocate 100% of reservations to a single sub-group. To prevent misuse, the Court has mandated that any sub-classification must be justified with empirical data demonstrating the sub-group’s inadequate representation.
The judgment delivered by CJI Chandrachud begins by referencing Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law and equal protection by the law. The judgment emphasizes that equality cannot be identical for individuals who are not similarly situated, underscoring the principle of substantive equality. The CJI states that the guarantee of equality means all persons in similar circumstances must be treated alike, ensuring parity of treatment under similar conditions. Equality does not imply sameness; the State can classify in a non-discriminatory manner. The doctrine of classification gives meaning to the guarantee of equal protection, focusing on equality of results or opportunities over equality of treatment.
In addressing whether sub-classification infringes on Article 14, the Chief Justice asserts that Article 14 guarantees factual equality rather than merely formal equality. Therefore, if individuals are not similarly situated with respect to the law’s objectives, classification is permissible. This logic extends to sub-classification, allowing further classification of an already established class for a limited purpose if it is heterogeneous for another purpose.
The Chief Justice also references Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s ideology, emphasizing his belief that a uniform criterion for identifying the depressed classes is unsuitable. Dr. Ambedkar noted that differences in tests of untouchability do not indicate differences in the conditions of the untouchables, as the underlying notion remains the same it is beneath dignity to interact with or touch persons of certain castes. He noted that differing levels of strictness in the practice of untouchability do not alter the fundamental nature of the discrimination.
Justice Trivedi, in her dissenting judgment, questioned the reference through which the present case was being heard by the Supreme Court. The doctrines of binding Precedents and Stare decisis, as well as judicial discipline and propriety developed over the years, require that a smaller Bench follows the decision of a larger Bench. If the smaller Bench has doubts or disagreements with a decision of a larger Bench, it may refer the matter for reconsideration to the larger Bench, but only after providing reasons and justification for why it could not agree or follow the earlier decision. Such disagreements must be based on justifiable reasons, such as the earlier decision being manifestly wrong or substantial changes in the contextual values that led to the earlier view. A casual exercise of referring the matter to a larger Bench without recording reasons or simply because the later view seems more reasonable can create legal uncertainty and confusion, which should be avoided.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court's decision in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh marks a significant shift in the jurisprudence surrounding the sub-classification of Scheduled Castes, diverging from the precedent set by the E.V. Chinnaiah case. By permitting sub-classification within SCs, the Court acknowledges the heterogeneous nature of Scheduled Castes and the need for more detailed and equitable distribution of reservations to address varying degrees of socio-economic disadvantage. This judgment aligns with the principle of substantive equality, ensuring that the most marginalized within already disadvantaged groups receive the necessary support. However, the Court has set a precedent for caution, mandating empirical justification for any sub-classification to prevent potential misuse. Justice Trivedi’s dissent highlights the importance of adhering to established judicial precedents and the potential risks of disrupting the legal stability through casual references to larger benches. While the ruling provides a more targeted approach to addressing disparities within Scheduled Castes, it also emphasizes the importance of careful application to uphold the core principles of equality and justice in the Constitution.

