
Article 25 and the Limits of Religious Freedom: Legal Perspectives on Conversion Laws
The Indian Constitution grants a sacred and powerful right under Article 25 — the freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise, and propagate religion. Yet, in recent years, this guarantee has been increasingly overshadowed by the rising tide of anti-conversion laws passed by various Indian states. What was once a clear and celebrated marker of India’s secular and pluralistic fabric has now become a battlefield of legal, social, and political contestation.
The constitutional protection of religious freedom is not absolute. Article 25 is subject to public order, morality, health, and other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. However, the manner in which states like Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Himachal Pradesh have recently legislated against religious conversions suggests an overreach — one that appears to convert a fundamental
right into a state-regulated privilege.
These new-generation anti-conversion laws — notably the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, and similar laws in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat — criminalize conversions by force, fraud, allurement, or marriage. While preventing coercion is a legitimate state interest, the problem lies in how these terms are loosely defined, often conflated with legitimate expressions of religious belief or acts of charity. Even more concerning is the requirement for prior declaration and approval from district authorities before converting or performing a conversion — effectively making religious change a licensed act under government watch.
The Supreme Court, in the landmark Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977), upheld the validity of earlier anti-conversion laws in Odisha and Madhya Pradesh, interpreting the right to propagate religion as not including the right to convert. Yet this judgment, while constitutionally sound at the time, did not address the evolving scope of Article 21 — the right to life and personal liberty — which now includes the right to privacy and autonomy of choice, including religious identity.
In the contemporary context, this narrow reading of Article 25 may need reconsideration. Voluntary conversion — when free from force or fraud — is an act of conscience and personal liberty. Criminalizing such acts or imposing bureaucratic hurdles not only infringes upon Article 25 but also violates Article 21 and the principle of constitutional secularism. India's secularism, unlike the Western notion of strict separation, is based on “principled distance,” where the state neither promotes nor suppresses religion, but ensures equal respect for all faiths.
The concern over mass conversions or “Love Jihad” — a politically charged and poorly substantiated narrative — has often been cited to justify these laws. However, empirical data tells a different story. The 2021 Pew Research Center report on religion in India concluded that religious switching is rare, and most Indians remain within their birth religion. Moreover, in many reported cases under these laws, the courts have found little or no evidence of coercion.
A more recent and progressive interpretation came from the Gujarat High Court in Aasif Khan v. State of Gujarat (2024), which stayed certain provisions of the state’s law that criminalized conversion through interfaith marriage. The Court held that such provisions infringed upon personal liberty and the right to marry a person of one’s choice — a right already upheld by the Supreme Court in Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (2018).
As petitions challenging these laws are now pending before the Supreme Court, there lies a crucial opportunity for judicial rebalancing. The judiciary must clearly demarcate between protecting citizens from exploitative conversions and infringing upon their fundamental right to choose, reject, or change their faith.
In conclusion, Article 25 must not become a casualty of political expediency or cultural majoritarianism. The right to believe, not believe, or change belief is intrinsic to the dignity of the individual. While the state has a legitimate role in curbing coercive conversions, it must not assume the role of a moral gatekeeper. In a constitutional democracy, faith must be free — not forced, not forbidden, and certainly not feared. The judiciary must now rise to defend this freedom with the clarity, courage, and constitutional fidelity that the times demand.

