Basic Structure Doctrine: Origin and Evolution

In the journey of India’s constitutional democracy, few legal doctrines have had as profound an impact as the Basic Structure Doctrine. Born in the heat of political conflict and judicial introspection, this doctrine today stands as the strongest bulwark against arbitrary constitutional amendments. It is not just a legal principle—it is a living guardian of constitutional identity and democratic integrity.

The origin of the basic structure doctrine can be traced back to a time when there was growing tension between Parliament's amending powers and the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In the early years after independence, the Supreme Court of India took a largely conservative view, giving wide leeway to Parliament under Article 368, which deals with constitutional amendments.

In cases like Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951) and Sajjan Singh v. State of

Rajasthan (1965), the Court upheld Parliament’s power to amend any part of the Constitution, including fundamental rights.

But this idea didn’t sit well for long. A shift began with the landmark case of Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967). For the first time, the Supreme Court held that Parliament cannot amend Fundamental Rights, as those were considered sacrosanct. The judgment marked a turning point—it challenged the notion of unlimited parliamentary power and sparked a larger debate on whether the Constitution could be altered without limits.

The real foundation of the Basic Structure Doctrine was laid in the historic case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973). In a deeply divided 13-judge bench, the Court, by a narrow majority of 7:6, ruled that while Parliament can amend the Constitution, it cannot alter or destroy its basic structure. Chief Justice Sikri and others outlined what could be considered the “basic structure”—including supremacy of the Constitution, rule of law, separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, and fundamental rights. Though the list was not exhaustive, the Court made it clear that some core features of the Constitution lie beyond the reach of Parliament.

The Kesavananda judgment was a moment of judicial statesmanship. It attempted to strike a balance: acknowledging Parliament’s role in adapting the Constitution to changing times while also placing limits to protect its core. In simple words, the judgment said: You can modify the house, but you cannot pull down its foundation.

The evolution of this doctrine didn’t stop there. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), the Supreme Court struck down a constitutional amendment that sought to immunize the Prime Minister’s election from judicial scrutiny. The Court held that such a move violated the basic structure—particularly free and fair elections and judicial review. Later, in Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980), the Court further strengthened the doctrine, holding that limited amending power is itself part of the basic structure.

Over the years, the basic structure doctrine has been invoked in several key decisions, including S.R. Bommai (federalism and secularism), I.R. Coelho (judicial review of Ninth Schedule laws), and NJAC judgment (independence of judiciary). Each time, the doctrine has served as a constitutional compass, ensuring that amendments are not used as tools of convenience by those in power.

In conclusion, the Basic Structure Doctrine is not a judicial invention—it is a judicial interpretation born out of constitutional necessity. It ensures that while our Constitution is flexible enough to evolve, it is also firm enough to withstand political overreach. For a democracy as vibrant and diverse as India, this doctrine remains a pillar of constitutional morality. It reminds both Parliament and the people that the Constitution is not just a legal document—it is a trust, and its soul must remain intact.