The Expanding Use of the Goondas Act: Preventive Detention and Its Constitutional Boundaries

Preventive detention remains one of the most controversial features of India’s constitutional framework. While the Constitution under Articles 21 and 22 grants every individual the fundamental right to personal liberty, it simultaneously allows preventive detention in certain circumstances—a paradox that has long troubled civil libertarians. The Goondas Act, enacted initially in Tamil Nadu and later replicated in several states with varying nomenclatures, is one such preventive detention law that continues to spark debate. Designed to curb habitual offenders and protect public order, its expanding use has raised serious questions about constitutional limits, proportionality, and the fine line between state security and individual freedom.

At its core, the Goondas Act empowers the executive to detain individuals without trial for extended periods on the suspicion that they may commit offenses prejudicial

to public order. This preemptive framework, while intended as a tool against hardened offenders such as bootleggers, drug traffickers, or cybercriminals, is increasingly being applied against a broader category of individuals, including political protesters, small-time offenders, and even those yet to face a formal conviction. The expansion of this law’s scope has made critics argue that what was once an extraordinary measure is fast becoming a routine instrument of policing.

From a constitutional perspective, preventive detention was envisioned as an exception, not the rule. Article 22 permits it but places safeguards such as the maximum period of detention and the requirement of advisory board reviews. Yet, in practice, these safeguards are often diluted. Detainees may languish for months before meaningful review, while challenges in courts are weighed down by delays. The Supreme Court has time and again underscored that preventive detention must not substitute ordinary criminal law and should be invoked sparingly. However, the Goondas Act’s expansive interpretation in state practice often seems to sidestep this judicial caution.

The problem lies not only in the misuse of power but also in its chilling effect on civil liberties. When the Act is deployed against activists, student leaders, or individuals engaged in peaceful protest, it transforms from a mechanism of crime prevention into a tool of political suppression. This raises a troubling constitutional dilemma: is the state protecting public order, or is it stifling dissent under the guise of preventive detention? In a vibrant democracy, the latter poses grave risks to both individual rights and institutional legitimacy.

Proponents of the Goondas Act argue that it has a deterrent value, particularly in dealing with habitual offenders who exploit procedural loopholes in criminal law. With India’s courts overburdened and trials often prolonged, preventive detention is seen as a means to ensure immediate public safety. In volatile situations—such as communal flare-ups, organized crime syndicates, or narcotics networks—the state contends that the Act enables swift executive action where ordinary law might be too slow. But the constitutional cost of such convenience cannot be ignored.

The way forward requires striking a careful balance between state interests and constitutional freedoms. First, judicial scrutiny must be strengthened. High Courts and the Supreme Court should adopt a stricter standard of review for detention orders, particularly examining whether ordinary penal law could have sufficed. Second, transparency in executive decision-making is essential. Detailed reasoning, subject to limited public disclosure, should accompany detention orders to prevent arbitrary use. Third, legislatures must revisit the scope of such laws to ensure they do not become catch-all provisions for any conduct deemed inconvenient to the state.

India’s democratic promise rests on the principle that liberty is not to be sacrificed at the altar of expediency. Preventive detention may remain a constitutional reality, but its unchecked expansion through instruments like the Goondas Act risks normalizing an exception that was always meant to be rare. In recalibrating this balance, the judiciary, legislature, and executive must work together to reaffirm that public safety and individual liberty are not irreconcilable opposites but coexisting pillars of a constitutional democracy.